

# Leviathan

## Part 1: Man

Thomas Hobbes

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[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Longer omissions are reports, in [brackets], in normal-sized type.

Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* in Latin and in English; it is not always clear which parts were done first in English and which in Latin. The present text is based on the English version, but sometimes the Latin seems better and is followed instead. Edwin Curley's fine edition of the English work (Hackett, 1994) has provided all the information used here regarding the Latin version, the main lines of the translations from it, and other information included here between square brackets. Curley has also been generous in his personal help with difficult passages in the English version. —The name 'Leviathan' comes from the Book of Job, chapter 41. See Hobbes's chapter 28, last paragraph.

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## Introduction

[Hobbes uses 'art' to cover everything that involves thoughtful planning, contrivance, design, or the like. The word was often used in contrast to 'nature', referring to everything that happens not *artificially* but *naturally*, without anyone's planning to make it happen. Hobbes opens this Introduction with a rejection of that contrast.]

Nature is the art through which God made the world and still governs it. The art of man imitates in it many ways, one of which is its ability to make an *artificial animal*. Life is just a motion of limbs caused by some principal part inside the body; so why can't we say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as a watch does) have an artificial life? For what is the heart but a spring? What are the nerves but so many strings? What are the joints but so many wheels enabling the whole body to move in the way its designer intended? Art goes still further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, *man!* For by art is created that great *Leviathan* called a 'commonwealth' or 'state', which is just an artificial man—though bigger and stronger than the natural man, for whose protection and defence it was intended. ·Here are some details of the analogy between a commonwealth and a natural man·.

The chief authority in the commonwealth is an artificial  
 •soul, giving life and motion to the whole body ·as the soul does to the body of a natural man·;  
 the magistrates and other officers of the law are artificial  
 •joints;  
 reward and punishment are artificial •nerves; they are connected to the seat of the chief authority in such a way that every joint and limb is moved to do his duty, as natural nerves do in the body of a natural man.

the wealth and riches of all the members of the commonwealth are its •strength;  
 the people's safety is the commonwealth's •business;  
 advisors, by whom everything it needs to know is suggested to it, are its •memory;  
 justice is its artificial •reason;  
 laws are its artificial •will;  
 civil harmony is its •health;  
 sedition is its •sickness; and  
 civil war is its •death.

Lastly, the pacts and agreements by which the parts of this *body politic* were at first made, put together, and united, resemble that *fiat*—that 'Let us make man'—pronounced by God when he was creating the world.

To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will consider: ·In Part 1·: •what the commonwealth is made of (men) and who made it (men). ·In Part 2·: •How and through what agreements the commonwealth is made; what are the rights and legitimate power or authority of a sovereign; and what it is that can preserve a commonwealth and what can dissolve it. ·In Part 3·: •What is a Christian commonwealth. ·In Part 4·: •What is the kingdom of darkness.

Concerning the first topic, there is a saying that has recently become fashionable, that

Wisdom is acquired not by reading books but by reading men.

On the basis of this, people who show few other signs of wisdom take pleasure in showing what they think they have 'read in men'—by saying nasty things about them behind their backs. But there is another saying—not properly understood in recent times—through which men might learn

truly to read one another, if they would take the trouble. The saying is

*Nosce teipsum* [Latin for 'know yourself']—read yourself.

This has come to be used •to excuse the barbarous conduct of men in power towards their inferiors, or •to encourage men of low degree in disrespectful behaviour towards their betters. But that's not what it was meant for. It was meant •to teach us that if you are interested in the similarity of the thoughts and passions of one man to those of another, you should look into yourself, and consider what *you* do when you think, believe, reason, hope, fear, etc. and on what grounds you do so. That will enable you to 'read' and know what the thoughts and passions of all other men are on similar occasions. I say the similarity of passions, which are the same in all men—desire, fear, hope, etc.—not the similarity of the *objects* of the passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc. •There is less similarity among these•, because what a person wants, fears, etc. depends on his individual character and upbringing. •The objects of someone's passions are also harder to know about, because•

they are easy for him to hide; so much so that the writing in a man's heart (to continue with the 'reading' metaphor), so blotted and mixed up by dissembling, lying, faking and false beliefs, can be 'read' only by someone who can search hearts. We can sometimes learn from men's actions what they are up to; but to do this without comparing those actions with our own while taking into account all the relevant differences, is to decipher without a key, and to be for the most part deceived—by too much trust or too much distrust, depending on whether the 'reader' is himself a good man or a bad one.

Anyway, however skilled someone is at 'reading' others by their actions, that can serve him only with the few people he knows personally. Someone who is to govern a whole nation must read in himself not this or that particular man but *mankind*. This is hard to do, harder than learning any language or science; but when I have set before you in an orderly and clear manner my own 'reading' •of myself•, you will be left only with the task of considering whether it also applies to you. There is no other way to prove a doctrine of this kind.

## Part 1. Man

### Chapter 1. Sense

Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first taken one at a time, and then in a sequence with one thought depending on another. Each single thought is a representation or appearance of some quality or feature of a body outside us—what we call an *object*. Such objects work on the eyes, ears, and other parts of a man's body, and by working in different ways they produce different appearances.

The source of all those appearances is what we call SENSE; for there is no conception in a man's mind that wasn't first—either as a whole, or in parts—produced through the organs of sense.

For present purposes it isn't necessary to know what the natural cause of sense is, and I have written about that at length elsewhere. Still, to make my presentation complete, I will briefly discuss it here.

The cause of sense is the external body or object which presses the organ proper to each sense—either •immediately, as in taste and touch; or •through an intermediary, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling. This pressure is passed inwards, along the nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, to the brain and heart; there it causes a •resistance, or •counter-pressure, or •endeavour by the heart to deliver itself [= 'to disburden itself', 'to speak what is on its mind']. Because this endeavour (or counter-pressure) is *outward*, it seems to be some matter outside the body; and this seeming, or fancy [= 'mental representation or image'] is what we call 'sense'. For the eye it consists in shaped light or colour; for the ear,

in a sound; for the nostril, in an odour; for the tongue and palate, in a taste; and for the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and such other qualities as we detect through touch. All these 'sensible' qualities are—in the object that causes them—merely different motions of the matter by which the object presses on our organs. In us too—the ones who are pressed—the qualities are merely various motions; for they are caused by motions, and motion produces nothing but motion. But to us their appearance is *fancy*, the same waking as dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the eye makes us *fancy* a light, and pressing the ear produces a *fancied* noise, so also the bodies that we see or hear produce the same results through their strong though unobserved action. Those colours and sounds are *in us*; for if they were in the bodies or objects that cause them, they couldn't be separated from them. We know they *can* be separated from them, because through the use of a mirror the appearance can be in one place and the object in another; and echoes provide something similar for sounds. And though at the right distance and in the right circumstances the actual object seems to be clothed with the fancy that it causes in us, *still* the object is one thing the image or fancy is another. So that •sense in all cases is nothing but •fancy that is caused by the pressure—that is, by the motion—of external things on our eyes, ears, and other organs having that function.

But the philosophy schools through all the universities of the Christian world, on the basis of certain texts of Aristotle's,

teach a different doctrine. For the cause of vision they say that the thing that is seen sends out in all directions a *visible species*, and that seeing the object is receiving this visible species into the eye. (In English, a ‘visible species’ is a visible show, apparition, or aspect, or being-seen.) [Hobbes includes ‘being-seen’ on the strength of the fact that several dominant senses of the Latin *species* involve seeing. Other senses of the word don’t, but Hobbes’s unkind reason for his choice will appear in a moment.] And for the cause of hearing they say that the thing that is heard sends forth an *audible species* (that is, an audible aspect,

or audible being-seen) which enters the ear and creates hearing. Indeed, for the cause of understanding they say that the thing that is understood sends out *intelligible species*, that is, an intelligible being-seen, which comes into the understanding and makes us understand! I don’t say this in criticism of universities; I shall come later to the topic of their role in a commonwealth. But on the way to that I must take every opportunity to let you see what things would be amended in them ·if they played their proper role properly·; and one of these is the frequency of meaningless speech.

## Chapter 2. Imagination

Nobody doubts this:

When a thing lies still, it will lie still for ever unless something else moves it.

But this:

When a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion unless something else stops it

is not so easily assented to, although there is the same reason for it, namely, that nothing can change itself. That is because men measure not only •other men but •all other things by *themselves*: because they find that after moving *they* are subject to pain and fatigue, they think that *everything else* grows weary of motion, and of its own accord seeks rest. They don’t consider the possibility that the desire for rest that they find in themselves consists of

some other motion. And so we find the schools saying that heavy bodies fall downwards out of an appetite [= ‘desire’] for rest, and so as to conserve themselves in the place that is most proper for them; absurdly ascribing to inanimate things both •appetite and •knowledge of what is good for self-preservation—when such knowledge is more than man has! [By ‘the schools’ Hobbes refers to universities that teach philosophy in a manner heavily influenced by Aristotle. The term ‘schoolmen’ refers to teachers in such universities.]

When a body is once in motion, it moves for ever unless something else stops it; and whatever stops it does so gradually, over a period of time; it can’t extinguish the motion in an instant. We see that •when wind creates waves in the sea, the waves keep rolling for a long time after the

wind stops; and the same thing happens with •the motion that is made in the internal parts of a man when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the object is removed or the eyes closed, we still retain an image of the thing we have seen, though more obscure than when we saw it. This is what the Latins call *imagination*, from the image made in seeing, and they improperly apply the term to all the other senses as well. But the Greeks call it *fancy*, which means 'appearance', and is equally proper for all the senses. So •IMAGINATION is nothing but •decaying sense. It is found in men and many other living creatures, and occurs when they are sleeping as well as when they are awake.

The decay of sense in a person who is awake is not •the dying-down of the motion made in sense. Rather, it is an •obscuring of that motion, in the way the light of the sun obscures the light of the stars. In daytime just as much as at night, stars exercise their power to make themselves visible; but among the many strokes that our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies only the predominant one is sensed; so when the light of the sun is predominant we aren't affected by the action of the stars. And when an object is removed from our sight, the impression it made in us continues, but as it is followed by other objects that are more present to us and that work on us, the imagination of the past •object• is obscured and weakened, as the voice of a man is drowned by the noise from the street. From this it follows that •the longer the time is since the sight or •other• sensing of any object, •the weaker is the imagination •of it•. For the continual changes in a man's body eventually destroy the parts that were moved in sensing; and that is why distance of time has the same effect on us as distance in space. Just as at a great spatial distance the thing we look at appears dim, and fuzzy in its details, so also after great distance of time our imagination of the past is weak, and we

lose (for example) particular streets of cities we have seen, and particular details of events we have experienced. •We have two ways of talking about• this decaying sense: when we want to talk about •the thing itself—the fancy itself—we call it 'imagination', as I said before: but when we want to talk about •the decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, we call it 'memory'. So imagination and memory are a single thing that has different names for different purposes.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called 'experience'. Imagination is always of things that have been formerly perceived by sense, either •all at once or •by parts at several times. In the former case, imagining the whole object as it was presented to the senses, we have •*simple* imagination—as when you imagine a man or horse that you have seen before. The other is •*compounded* imagination, as when from the sight of a man at one time and of a horse at another you conceive in your mind a centaur. So when a man compounds the image of his own person with the image of the actions of someone else—as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Alexander (which happens often with devoted readers of romances)—it is a compound imagination, and strictly speaking just a fiction of the mind. There are other imaginations that arise in men (while they are awake) as a result of especially strong impressions made on them in sensing: for example, •gazing for a long time at the sun creates an image of the sun that stays before our eyes for a long time afterwards; and •from a long and fiercely focussed attention on geometrical figures, a waking man may when in the dark have the images of lines and angles before his eyes. This kind of fancy has no particular name, because it is not something we talk about much.

The imaginations that people have while asleep are what we call 'dreams'. A dream, like all other imaginations, has

previously been in the senses, either all together as a whole or in bits. The brain and nerves, which are the necessary organs of sense, are so benumbed in sleep that they can't easily be moved by the action of external objects; and therefore in sleep no imagination—and therefore no dream—can occur except as a result of the agitation of the inner parts of the person's body. And even when these inner parts are out of order, their connection with the brain and other organs enables them to keep these in motion, In this way the imaginations formerly made inside the man appear as if he were awake, except for this: the organs of sense are now (in sleep) benumbed, so that no new object can dominate and obscure the imaginations with a more vigorous impression; and so, in this silence of sense, a dream must be *more* clear than are our waking thoughts. That is how it comes about that it is difficult—some think impossible—to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For my part, when I consider that •in dreams I don't often or constantly think of the same persons, places, objects, and actions that I do waking; and that •I don't remember as long a sequence of coherent thoughts in dreams as at other times; and that •when I am awake I often note the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts; I am well satisfied that when I am awake I know that I am not dreaming, even though when I dream I think I am awake.

And because dreams are caused by the disorder of some of the inner parts of the body, different disorders are bound to cause different dreams. For being cold in one's sleep breeds dreams of fear, and raises the thought and image of some fearful object (because the motion from the brain to the inner parts is matched by an opposite motion from the inner parts to the brain). Another example: just as •anger causes •heat in some parts of the body when we are awake, so when we sleep •the over-heating of the same parts causes

•anger, and raises up in the brain the imagination of an enemy. Another example: just as natural kindness when we are awake causes desire, which creates heat in certain other parts of the body, so also too much heat in those parts while we are asleep raises in the brain an imagination of some kindness shown. In short: our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations. The motion when we are awake starts at one end. and when we dream it starts at the other.

It is hardest for a man to distinguish a dream from his waking thoughts when for some reason he doesn't realize that he has been asleep. This can easily happen to someone who is full of fearful thoughts and has a conscience that is much troubled, and to someone who sleeps without the performance of undressing and going to bed—e.g. someone who nods off in his armchair. Someone who takes trouble readying himself for sleep isn't likely to think that any weirdly unfamiliar fancy that comes to him is anything but a dream. We read of Marcus Brutus (who owed his life to Julius Caesar, and was his favourite, yet murdered him) how at Philippi, the night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearful apparition. Historians usually call it a vision; but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge it to have been merely a short dream. For sitting in his tent, brooding and troubled with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for Brutus, slumbering in the cold, to dream of what frightened him most; and as this fear gradually woke him up, it must also have made the apparition gradually vanish; and not knowing for sure that he had been asleep, he could have no reason to think it a dream, or anything but a vision. And this is not a rare occurrence; for even people who are wide awake, if they are nervous and superstitious and full of scary stories and alone in the dark, are apt to have such fancies and to believe they see spirits and dead men's ghosts walking in churchyards—when really it is either their fancy



or else trickery by others making use of such superstitious fear to pass disguised in the night to places they don't want to be known to frequent.

This ignorance of how to distinguish •dreams and other strong fancies from •seeing and sensing is the chief source of the religion of the pagans of past centuries, who worshipped satyrs, fawns, nymphs, and the like; and the source of the belief that uneducated people have *now* in fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and in the power of witches. •I include witches in that list because •I don't think that their witchcraft is any real power. Still, I think they are justly punished for their false belief that they can do such mischief, together with their intention of doing harm if they can; so that their trade is nearer to a being a new religion than to being a craft or science. As for fairies and walking ghosts, I think the belief in *them* has deliberately been taught (or not challenged) so as to keep people believing in the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy water, and other such inventions of ghostly men [here = 'religious men', a joke usage].

No doubt God *can* make unnatural apparitions; but it is not an article of the Christian faith that he does this so often that men should fear such things more than they fear a stoppage of, or change in, the course of nature—either of which God can also bring about. But •claims about the frequency of divinely sent apparitions are still made, because •evil men, under pretext that God can do anything, are impudently willing to say *anything* when it suits their purposes, even if they think it untrue. A wise man will believe them no further than right reason makes what they say seem credible. Men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience if •this superstitious fear of spirits were got rid of, and with it •future-reading based on dreams, •false prophecies, and •many other effects of such superstition by which crafty ambitious men abuse simple people.

This •cleansing operation• ought to be the work of the schools, but instead of doing it they *encourage* such doctrines. Because the schoolmen don't know what imagination or the senses are, •they have no defences against error in these matters, and so• they teach what they have been taught. Some say that •imaginings arise spontaneously and have no cause; others, •that they usually arise from the will, and that good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by God, and evil thoughts blown in by the Devil, or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and evil ones poured in by the Devil. [Hobbes is mockingly exploiting the fact that 'inspire' and 'infuse' come from Latin meaning 'breathe in' and 'pour in' respectively.] Some say that •the senses receive the 'species' of things and pass them on to the 'common sense', thence to the imagination, to the memory, to the judgment—like passing *things* from hand to hand, with many words making nothing understood. [For 'species' see the last paragraph of chapter 1; 'common sense' is a supposed organ or faculty which, according to Aristotle, integrates the materials provided by the five specialized senses.]

The imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature capable of imagining) by words or other voluntary signs is what we generally call *understanding*. It is common to man and beast; for a dog will through custom come to understand the call, or the scolding, of his master, and so will many other beasts. •That, however, involves only understanding what his master *wants*•. The understanding that is special to man •and not shared with the beasts• is the understanding not only of what others *want* but also of what they *think* and *believe*; and this understanding is based on the how sequences of names of things into are woven together into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech. I shall discuss this kind of understanding later.

### Chapter 3. The consequence or train of imaginations

By 'consequence of thoughts' or 'TRAIN of thoughts' I mean the occurrence of thoughts, one at a time, in a sequence; we call this 'mental discourse', to distinguish it from discourse in words.

When a man thinks about something, what his *next* thought will be is not quite as accidental a matter as it seems to be. It isn't the case that any thought is as likely as any other to follow a given thought. On the contrary: just as we never have •an imagination that hasn't previously been presented to us—as a whole or in parts—by our senses, so we never have •a transition from one imagination to another that is unlike any transition we have had in our senses. Here is why. All fancies are motions inside us, left-overs from the motions made in sensing; and when one motion is immediately followed by another in sensing, that sequence of motions also continues after the sensing is over, because when the former motion again occurs and predominates, the latter motion follows, by coherence of the matter moved [Hobbes's exact phrase]. •A familiar example of the same phenomenon•: When water is pooled on a flat surface, and you draw some of it in one direction with your finger, the rest of the water follows. However, a thing perceived by the senses will be followed sometimes by one thing and sometimes by another, so that in due course •there come to be rival candidates for the role of follower of a given imagination•. Thus, when someone imagines something, there is no certainty about what he will imagine next; but it is certain that it will be something that followed the other at one or another earlier time.

This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, unplanned, and inconstant. In this

the sequence of thoughts is not governed by any passionate thought which could direct the whole sequence towards some chosen end; and the thoughts are said to 'wander', and seem irrelevant to one another, as in a dream. Men often have thoughts like this when they are alone and not absorbed in any cares; their thoughts are still as busy as at other times, but there is no harmony to them—like the sound of an untuned lute or of a tuned one played by an incompetent. Yet in this untamed roaming of the mind we can still often see what is going on, and grasp how one thought depends on another. For in a discussion about England's present civil war, what could seem more irrelevant than to ask, as someone did, *What was the value of a Roman penny?* But I saw its relevance plainly enough: the thought of •the war introduced the thought of •the delivering up of the king to his enemies, which brought in the thought of •the delivering up of Christ, which led to the thought of •the 30 pennies [thirty pieces of silver] which was the price of that betrayal; and from that the malicious question •about the value of a Roman penny• easily followed. All this happened in a moment of time, for thought is quick.

The second •sort of train of thoughts• is more constant, being regulated by some desire, and some design. The impression made by things that we desire or fear is strong and permanent, or if it stops for a time it comes back quickly. It is sometimes so strong that it keeps us awake at night, or interrupts our sleep. From •desire arises •the thought of some means that we have seen produce something like what we aim at; and from that comes •the thought of means to those means, and so on, continually, until we come to some beginning that is within our own power. What we

are aiming at—our *end*—makes a strong impression and so comes often to mind, so that if our thoughts begin to wander they are quickly brought back into line by this strong and frequently-present impression of the end. It was his knowledge of this that led one of the seven wise men to give his followers the injunction (now a cliché) *Respice finem* [Latin, = 'look to the end']; that is to say, in all your actions keep an eye on what you are aiming at, letting your view of that direct all your thoughts about how to achieve it.

The train of regulated thoughts is itself of two kinds. •In one we imagine an effect and look for the causes or means that would produce it; and this is common to man and beast. It is the kind of thinking I focussed on in the preceding paragraph. •The other occurs when we imagine something—*anything*—and look for all the possible effects that could be produced by it; that is, we imagine what we can *do with it* when we have it. I have never seen any sign of this except in man; for this kind of curiosity, asking 'What can I *do with it*?', has little grip on a living creature that has no passions except sensual ones such as hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind when it is controlled by some aim or plan is nothing but *seeking*, or the faculty of invention [here = 'discovery'], which the Latins called *sagacitas* and *solertia* [= 'keenness of scent' and 'skill' or 'ingenuity']. It is a hunting out of the causes of some present or past effect, or of the effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks something he has lost; and from the place and time where he missed it his mind runs back, from place to place and time to time, to find where and when he had it; that is to say, to find some definite limited time and place in which to start searching. Again, from there his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action or other occasion might have made him lose it. We call this 'remembrance' or 'calling to mind'. The Latins call it

*reminiscentia*, as it were *scanning again* our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a definite place within which he has to search; and then his thoughts run over all the parts of it, in the way one would sweep a room to find a jewel, or as a spaniel runs all over a field till he picks up a scent, or as a man might run through the alphabet to make a rhyme.

Sometimes a man wants to know the outcome of an action; and then he thinks back to some earlier action of the same kind, and the sequence of *its* outcomes, supposing similar outcomes will follow similar actions. For example, someone may foresee what will become of a criminal by running over what he has seen follow from similar crime before, having these thoughts in this order: the crime, the arresting officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Thoughts of this kind are called *foresight* and *prudence* or *providence*, and sometimes *wisdom*; though this kind of guesswork is very fallacious, because of the difficulty of taking into account all the relevant circumstances. Still, this much is certain: if one man has more experience of things past than another does, the former will be correspondingly more prudent than the latter, and less often wrong in his expectations. Only the present has an existence in nature; things past exist in the memory only; and future things don't exist at all, because the future is just a fiction [= 'creation'] of the mind, arrived at by noting the consequences that have ensued from *past* actions and assuming that similar *present* actions will have similar consequences (an assumption that pushes us forward into the supposed *future*). This kind of extrapolation is done the most securely by the person who has the most experience, but even then not with complete security. And though it is called 'prudence' when the outcome is as we expected, it is in its own nature a mere presumption. For the ability to *see in advance* things that are to come, which is *providence* [from Latin *providentia*,

the power to see into the future], belongs only to ·God·, whose will will *make* them come. He alone can prophesy, and he does it supernaturally. The person who does the best job of prophesying *naturally* is the best guesser; and the best guesser is the one who knows most about the matters he guesses at and has studied them most thoroughly, for he has most signs to guess by.

A *sign* is the evident •antecedent of the consequent, and in the other direction the •consequent of the antecedent. ·For example, •dark clouds may be a sign that rain is to come; •a burning tree may be a sign that lightning has struck·. This requires that similar consequences have been observed before; and the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain is the sign. And therefore he who has most experience in any kind of business has most signs by which to guess what the future holds, and consequently is the most prudent: and his advantage in prudence over someone to whom that kind of business is new is not counterbalanced by *any* advantage that the latter may have in natural cleverness and quick-wittedness—though perhaps many young men would disagree with this!

Nevertheless, prudence is not what distinguishes man from beast. Some beasts when one year old observe more, and more prudently pursue what is for their good, than a child can do at age ten.

As prudence is a presumption about •the future condensed from experience of •the past, so also there is a presumption about •past things on the basis of other •*past* things. Someone who has seen how and to what extent a flourishing state has come first into civil war and then to ruin, when he sees the similarly ruined condition of any other state will guess that the latter has had a similar war brought about in a similar way. But this ·kind of· conjecture is nearly as uncertain as conjectures about the future, both

being based only on experience.

This is the only kind of mental act I can think of that is *naturally* planted in man, so that all he needs in order to be able to perform it is to be born a human and to live with the use of his five senses. The other faculties that I shall discuss later—ones that seem to be possessed only by men ·and not by the beasts·—are acquired and improved by study and hard work. Most men get them through instruction and discipline; and they all come from the invention of words and speech. For the mind of man has no motions except those of •sense, •thoughts, and •sequences of thoughts, but through the help of speech, and method, those same faculties can be improved to an extent that marks men off from all other living creatures.

Whatever we imagine is *finite*. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call *infinite*. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite size, or conceive infinite speed, infinite time, infinite force, or infinite power. When we say something is ‘infinite’ we signify only that •we can’t conceive its ends or boundaries, having no conception of infinity except that of •our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used •not to make us conceive him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness, and power can’t be conceived) but •to get us to honour him. Also, recall what I said before, namely that anything we conceive we have first perceived by sense, either all at once or in parts; a man can’t have a thought representing something that couldn’t be sensorily perceived. So anything a man can conceive must be conceived ·as being· •in some place, and •having a definite size, and •divisible into parts; and he can’t conceive that something can be all in *this* place and all in *that*, or that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once. None of these things has—none of them *could*—ever be presented through the senses. They are merely

absurd ways of talking, credulously taken over—in all their meaninglessness—from deceived scientists and deceived (or

deceiving!) schoolmen.

## Chapter 4. Speech

The invention of •printing, though ingenious, is a minor affair compared with the invention of •writing. (We don't know who first discovered the use of writing. It was first brought into Greece, they say, by Cadmus, the son of King Agenor of Phoenicia.) Writing was a *profitable* invention—good for continuing the memory of the past, and also for inter-connecting people who are dispersed into so many and such distant regions of the earth. But it was also an invention that was *difficult* to make: it required careful observation of the different movements of the tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech, so as to make correspondingly different letters to remember them by. But the most noble and profitable invention of all was that of •SPEECH, consisting of names or appellations, and ways of connecting them. Men use speech to •register their •present-thoughts, to •recall their past thoughts, and to •declare their thoughts to one another for mutual utility and conversation. Without speech men would not have had commonwealth, or society, or contract, or peace—any more than lions, bears, and wolves do. The first author of speech was Adam, who named the created things that God presented to his sight; •we don't know *how* he went about doing this, for the Scripture says no more about it. But this was sufficient to lead him •to add more names, as his experience and use of created things gave him a need for them; and gradually •to come to join them together in ways that would let him make himself understood. And so in the course of time he could achieve

as much language as he found a use for, though not as rich a language as an orator or philosopher needs. For I don't find anything in the Scripture which explicitly says, or which implies, that Adam gave names to every variety of figures, numbers, measures, colours, sounds, fancies, relations; much less that he imposed the names of words and •parts or kinds of speech, such as 'general', 'special', 'affirmative', 'negative', 'interrogative', 'optative', 'infinitive', all which are useful; and least of all •the likes of 'entity', 'intentionality', 'quiddity', and other insignificant words of the schools.

But all this language that was achieved and enlarged by Adam and his descendants was lost again at the tower of Babel, when every man was punished by God for his rebellion by being made to forget his former language. And as they were forced by this to disperse into different parts of the world, it must be that the variety of tongues that we now have was gradually brought about by them—that is, by men scattered throughout the world—in such ways as met their needs (need being the mother of all inventions); and eventually language everywhere became more copious.

What speech is for—to put it in the most general terms—is to carry our mental discourse over into verbal discourse, or the train of our thoughts into a train of words. This is useful to us in two ways, •one private, the other public. •One is the registering of our thought-sequences; these are apt to slip out of our memory, putting us to the trouble of recovering

them, and we can be helped in that by recalling the words they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for *marks* or *notes* of remembrance. •The other occurs when many people use the same words to signify to one another (by the connection and order of the words) what they conceive or think about each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. Words used in this way are called *signs*.

Special uses of speech are these. (1) To register what we have found through our thoughts to be •the cause of anything, present or past; and what we think •the effects will be of things present or past. All this amounts to the acquiring of arts [= 'knowledge relating to practical skills']. (2) To show to others the knowledge we have attained; which is to advise and teach one another. (3) To make known to others our wants and purposes, so that we can help one another. (4) To please and delight ourselves and others by innocently playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament.

Corresponding to these uses, there are four misuses of speech. (1) When men register their thoughts wrongly through inconstancy in the meanings of their words, leading them to register for their conceptions something that they never conceived, thus deceiving themselves. (2) When they use words metaphorically, that is, in senses other than the ones they are ordained to have, thereby deceiving others. (3) When by words they declare something to be what they want which isn't what they want. (4) When they use words to injure one another; for seeing that nature has enabled living creatures to injure their enemies—some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands—it is just a misuse of speech to injure someone with the tongue, unless it is someone whom we are obliged to govern, and even then our role is not to injure but to correct and improve. [In Hobbes's time 'injure' could mean 'insult'.]

How does speech help us to remember sequences of causes and effects? By imposing names on things, and making connections among the names.

Some names are *proper* and apply to only one thing—for example, 'Peter', 'John', 'this man', 'this tree'. Others are common to many things, for example 'man', 'horse', 'tree'. Each of these is just a single name, but it is the name of many particular things; and considered as a name of all of them together it is called *a universal*; for the only universal things in the world are merely names. The things named are every one of them individual and singular.

One universal name is imposed on many things on the basis of their likeness in some quality or feature; and whereas a proper name brings to mind only one thing, universals recall any one of those many.

Among universal names, some are of greater extent and some of less, with the former including the latter in their extent; and some pairs of universal names are of equal extent, each including the other. For example, the name 'body' has a larger range of application than the word 'man', and includes it; and the names 'man' and 'rational' are of equal extent, each including the other. I should point out that a 'name' is not necessarily a single word (as it is in grammar). Sometimes it consists of many words together. For the words 'he who in his actions observes the laws of his country' constitute a single name, equivalent to the one-word name 'just'.

By this imposition of names, some with wider scope and some with narrower, we turn calculations concerning sequences of •things imagined in the mind into calculations concerning sequences of •names. Here is an example. Suppose that a man who has no use of speech at all (like someone who is born totally deaf and dumb, and remains so) looks at a triangle and, beside it, two right angles such as the

corners of a square. He may thoughtfully compare them and find that the three angles of that triangle are equal to the two right angles at its side. But if *another* triangle is shown to him, different in shape from the former one, he can't know without working it out all over again whether the three angles of this second triangle are also equal to the two right angles. Compare that with someone who has the use of words. When *he* observes that the equality depends not on •the length of the triangle's sides or on any other details about it, but only on the fact that •its sides are straight and its angles three, and that *this was the basis for his naming it a 'triangle'*, he will boldly draw the universal conclusion that such equality of angles occurs in all triangles whatsoever; and will register his discovery in these general terms: *Every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles*. And thus the thought-sequence found in one particular case comes to be registered and remembered as a universal rule; that clears *time* and *place* out of our mental calculation, lets us off from all labour of the mind except the first •labour of proving the universal rule, and makes what we find to be true *here* and *now* to be true at all times and places.

But the use of words in registering our thoughts is nowhere else as evident as it is in numbering. A natural fool [= 'a congenitally intellectually deprived person'] who could never learn by heart the order of the numerals 'one', 'two', and 'three', may •hear every stroke of the clock and nod to it, or •say 'one', 'one', 'one'; but he can never •know what hour it strikes. And it seems that there was a time when those names of numbers were not in use, and men had to use the •fingers of one or both their hands to keep tallies of things; and that that's why numeral words today go no higher than •ten in any nation, and in some only up to five, and then they begin again. And someone who can count to ten will, if he recites the numerals out of order, lose himself and not know

when he has recited them all. Much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all the other operations of arithmetic. So that without words it is impossible to calculate with numbers, still less with sizes, speeds, degrees of force, and other things that have to be calculated if mankind is to survive and flourish.

When two names are joined together into a sequence or affirmation such as 'A man is a living creature' or 'If he is a man, he is a living creature', if the second name 'living creature' applies to everything that the first name 'man' applies to, then the affirmation or name-sequence is true; otherwise it is false. For 'true' and 'false' are attributes of *speech*, not of *things*. Where there is no speech, there is neither truth nor falsehood. There may be *error*, as when we expect something that doesn't happen, or suspect something that has not happened; but in neither case can a man be accused of untruth.

Seeing then that truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man who seeks precise truth needs to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly; otherwise he will find himself entangled in words like a bird in lime twigs: the more he struggles the more thoroughly he is belimed [= 'caught in the sticky stuff']. And therefore in geometry, which is virtually the only precise science, men begin by settling the meanings of their words in what they call 'definitions', which they place at the start of their calculations.

This brings out how necessary it is for anyone who aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of previous authors, and either to make them his own or, when they are negligently set down, to correct them. For errors in definitions multiply themselves as the calculation proceeds, leading men into absurdities which eventually they •see, but can't •avoid without starting again from the beginning,

which contains the source of their errors. That is how it happens that those who trust *books* behave like those who add up many little sums into a bigger one without considering whether the little ones they started with were rightly calculated; and when at last they see that something has gone wrong they don't know how to clear themselves of error. Instead of mistrusting the principles of their masters as laid down in the books from which they started, they spend time fluttering over their books like birds trapped in a room, who flutter at the false light of a glass window because they haven't the intelligence to consider that they came in through the chimney.

So the first use of speech is in the right definition of names, which is the acquisition of science; and the first misuse of language is in wrong definitions or the lack of definitions. The latter is the source of all false and senseless tenets, which make men who try to learn from the authority of books rather than from their own meditation to be as much below the condition of merely ignorant men as men endued with true science are above it. For between true science and erroneous doctrines, mere ignorance is in the middle—worse than true science but better than false doctrines. Natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself can't err; error is possible only where there is language. When someone comes to have a richly expressive language he becomes wiser than average—or madder! A man needs the use of writing if he is to become excellently wise—or excellently foolish (unless his memory is damaged by disease or physical defect). For words are wise men's counters, used merely in calculations; but they are the money of fools, who value them on the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, a Thomas Aquinas, or any other teacher whatever.

Names can be used for anything that can enter into or be considered in an account—any things that can be added one to another to make a sum, or subtracted one from another and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of money *rationes*, and they called accounting *rationatio*; and what we in bills or account-books call 'items' they called *nomina*, that is, *names*; and from that usage they seem to have gone on to extend the word *ratio* [= 'reason'] to the ability to calculate generally, in all other things as well as with numbers. The Greeks have only one word, *logos*, for both speech and reason; not because they thought there is no speech without reason, but because they thought there is no reasoning without speech; and they called the act of reasoning *sylogism*, which means *summing up* the consequences of one statement to those of another. And because a single thing can enter into an account on the basis of different features of it, the names of things are variously diverted from their original meanings and diversified, so as to express the differences of features. This variety among names can be brought under four general headings.

(1) A thing may enter into account as matter or body under such labels as 'living', 'sensible', 'rational', 'hot', 'cold', 'moved', 'quiet'; with all these names the word 'matter' or 'body' is understood, because they are all names of matter—that is, stand for properties that only matter can have.

(2) A thing can enter into account, or be considered, for some feature or quality that we conceive to be in it—for example, being moved, being a foot long, being hot, etc.—and then we take the name of the thing itself and change or divert it into a name for that feature or quality that we are considering: for 'living' we put into the account 'life', for 'moved' we put 'motion', for 'hot' we put 'heat', for 'long' we put 'length, and the like: and all such names as these are the names of the features and properties by which one



matter (body) is distinguished from another. These are called *abstract* names, not because the features or properties are separated from matter, but because their names are separated from the account of matter.

(3) We bring into account the properties of our own bodies through which we distinguish things. For example, when we see something we don't talk about the thing itself but rather the sight, the colour, the idea of it in the fancy; and when we hear something we talk not about it but about the hearing or sound only, which is our fancy or conception of it through the ear. Such words as 'green' and 'loud' are names of fancies.

(4) We bring into account and consider and give names to *names* themselves, and to *speeches*. For 'general', 'universal', 'special' and 'equivocal' are names of names. And 'affirmation', 'interrogation', 'commandment', 'narration', 'syllogism', 'sermon', 'oration', and many other such, are names of speeches.

And that is all the variety of positive names, which are used to mark something that exists in nature or is invented by the mind of man: (1) bodies that exist or are conceived to exist, or (2) bodies whose properties exist or (3) may be feigned [= 'supposed'] to exist, or (4) words and speech.

There are also other names, called 'negative', whose role is to signify that a word is *not* the name of the thing in question—for example, 'nothing', 'no man', 'infinite', 'un-teachable', and the like. [The next bit is difficult.]

**Hobbes's text:** which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning, and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing, because they make us refuse to admit of names not rightly used.

**One reading:** They're of use in calculating, and correcting calculations; they call to mind our past thoughts; but they are not names of anything, because all they do is to signify

that some name, properly used, is *not* applicable to the item in question.

**Alternative reading:** Calling to mind our past thoughts (though without being names of anything), they are of use in calculating and in correcting calculations because they get us to refuse to apply names that are wrongly used.

All other names are merely insignificant sounds. There are two kinds of them. One occurs when a word is new, and its meaning not explained by definition; the schoolmen have coined new terms in abundance, thereby puzzling philosophers.

The other occurs when men put together into a single name two names whose meanings are contradictory and inconsistent—for example, 'an incorporeal body', or (same thing) 'an incorporeal substance', and a great many more. For whenever an affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, when put together and made into a single name, one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it is false to say that *a quadrangle is round*, the word 'round quadrangle' signifies nothing and is a mere sound. Similarly, if it is false to say that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words 'in-poured virtue' and 'in-blown virtue', although people have, absurdly, written of virtue as being 'inspired' and 'infused'. When you encounter a senseless and insignificant word, it is nearly always composed of Latin or Greek names. . . .

When a man hears some speech and has the thoughts that those words in that order were ordained and constituted to signify, then he is said to *understand* it; understanding being nothing but *conception caused by speech*. So if speech is confined to man (as for all I know it is), then understanding is also confined to him. It also follows that there can be no question of *understanding* an affirmation if it is universally

absurd and false; though many think they understand something when really they are merely repeating the words in a murmur or running over them in their mind.

I shall talk about what kinds of speeches signify the appetites, aversions, and passions of man's mind, and of their use and misuse, after I have treated the passions.

The names of things that please or displease us have inconstant meanings in common discourse, because likes and dislikes vary from person to person, and even for one person at different times. All names are designed to signify our conceptions, and all our states are merely conceptions; so when you and I conceive one thing differently we can hardly avoid naming it differently. Although the nature of the thing we conceive is the same, our different receptions of

it—because of how we differ in the constitutions of our bodies and the prejudices of our opinions—gives everything we say some flavour of our different passions. In reasonings, therefore, we must *watch the words*; for a word, besides signifying what we imagine to be the nature of the thing to which the word applies, also signifies the nature, disposition, and interests of the speaker. The names of virtues and vices are examples of this: one man calls 'wisdom' what another calls 'fear', one calls 'cruelty' what another calls 'justice', one calls 'wastefulness' what another calls 'generosity', and so on. And therefore such names can never be secure bases for reasoning. Nor can metaphors and figures of speech; but these are less dangerous, because they announce their inconstancy, which the others do not.

## Chapter 5. Reason and science

When a man reasons, all he does is to conceive a sum total from the •*addition* of portions, or conceive a remainder from the •*subtraction* of one sum from another. If this is done in words, it is •conceiving the name of the whole as coming from the names of all the parts, or •conceiving the name of one part as coming from the names of the whole and of the other part. For some things (such as numbers) we have not only 'adding' and 'subtracting' but also names for other operations, such as 'multiplying' and 'dividing'. Yet these are not wholly new operations; for multiplication is merely

adding equal things together, and division is nothing but subtracting one thing as often as we can. These operations are performed not only with numbers but with all sorts of things that can be added together and subtracted one from another. Just as arithmeticians teach how to add and subtract in numbers, so the geometers teach how to do the same with lines, figures (two- and three-dimensional), angles, proportions, times, degrees of speed, force, power, and the like; the logicians teach the same with respect to sequences of words, adding together two names to make

an affirmation, two affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllogisms to make a proof; and from the sum—or conclusion—of a syllogism they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers on politics add together treaties and agreements to find men's duties; and lawyers add together laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In brief: •wherever there is a place for addition and subtraction, there also is a place for reasoning; and •where these have no place, reason has nothing to do.

Out of all this we can define (that is to say, fix) what is meant by the word 'reason', taken as naming one of the faculties of the mind. For REASON in this sense is nothing but calculating (that is, adding and subtracting) sequences of general names agreed on to mark and signify our thoughts—*mark* them when we calculate by ourselves, and *signify* them when we are demonstrating or recommending our calculations to other men.

People who are not practised in arithmetic are bound to make mistakes and get wrong answers, and even expert arithmeticians can do so. Similarly in any other subject of reasoning the ablest, most careful, and most practised men can deceive themselves and infer false conclusions. This is not to deny that •reason itself is always right reason, but no •one man's reason—nor even the reason of any group of men, however large—makes the conclusion certain. Similarly, arithmetic •itself• is a certain and infallible art, but no calculation is guaranteed to be right just because a great many men have unanimously approved it. So when there is •a controversy about some calculation, the disputants must on their own initiative agree on some arbitrator or judge whose reason they will accept as right reason, since no standard for right reason has been set up by nature; and the same thing holds in •all debates of every kind. And when men who think themselves wiser than everyone else clamour

and demand that *right reason* be the judge, yet actually seek that things should be settled by *their* reason and no-one else's, it is as intolerable in the society of men as it would be in a card game if, after trumps had been settled, someone always played as trumps whatever suit he had most of in his hand at that moment. For that's what people are doing when they insist, in any controversies they are involved in, that their strongest passion at a given moment shall count just then as right reason—revealing their *lack* of right reason by the claim they lay to it!

What reason is for—and the right way to use it—is not to find the added-up truth of one, or just a few, •word-sequences that are remote from the first definitions and settled meanings of names; but to begin with the latter and proceed from one sequence to another. For one can't be certain of the final conclusion without being certain of all the affirmations and negations from which it was inferred. Suppose that the master of a household, when making up his accounts, adds up the sums of all the bills of expense into one large sum, without looking into •how each bill has been added up by those who presented them to him, or into •what he is paying for •in each•; he does himself no more good than if he just accepted the bottom-line sum •as calculated for him by an accountant•, trusting the skill and honesty of *all* the accountants. •There is no point in checking *some* parts of the calculation if one doesn't check them *all*•. In the same way, someone who in reasoning about something—anything—starts by taking on trust the conclusions of authors, and doesn't derive them •for himself• from the •proper• starting-points in every calculation (namely, the meanings of names as settled by definitions), wastes his labour; and •at the end of it all• he doesn't *know* anything but merely *believes*.

Suppose a man is calculating without the use of words. (This is possible in relation to particular things, as when on seeing one thing we conjecture what was likely to have preceded it or is likely to follow it.) If what he thought likely to follow doesn't follow, or what he thought likely to have preceded didn't precede, this is called 'error'; and even the most prudent men are subject to it. But when we are reasoning in words with general meanings, if we employ a general inference that is false, though this will commonly be called 'error', it is really an *absurdity*, or *senseless speech*. For error is merely going wrong in presuming that something is past or to come—something which, even if •in fact it is neither past nor to come, is not •impossible so far as we can discover. But when we make a general assertion, unless it is a true one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words by which we conceive nothing but the sound are what we call 'absurd', 'insignificant', and 'nonsense'. Thus, if a man were to talk to me of

- (1) a round quadrangle,
- (2) qualities of bread in cheese,
- (3) immaterial substances,
- (4) a free subject, a free will, or any sort of 'free' other than freedom from being hindered by opposition,

I wouldn't say he was in error, but rather that his words had no meaning, that is to say, absurd. [In that quartet, (1) is obviously faulty; (3) and (4) are philosophical views that Hobbes opposes, and (2) is meant to be obviously faulty while also being reminiscent of the Catholic doctrine that in the sacrament of the eucharist the qualities of bread are to be found not 'in cheese' but in the body of Jesus.]

As I said in chapter 2, man surpasses all other animals in this: when he thinks about anything whatever, he is apt to enquire into the consequences of it and into what he can do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence—that is something else in which man surpasses

the other animals, though really it is a development of the 'enquiry' excellence just discussed. It is that man can, by the use of words, get the conclusions he arrives at into general rules, called 'theorems' or 'aphorisms'. That is, he can reason or calculate not only with •numbers but with •things of any sort in which one can be added to or subtracted from another.

But this privilege is lessened through being accompanied by another, namely the 'privilege' of absurdity! Absurdity besets no living creature except man; and among men, the ones who are most subject to it are the philosophers. For what Cicero says of them somewhere is most true—that there can be nothing too absurd to be found in books by philosophers. The reason for this is obvious. It is that they never begin their thinking from the starting-point of definitions or explanations of the names they plan to use; which is a method that has been used in geometry—making its conclusions indisputable—and hasn't been used anywhere else. I shall now list seven causes of absurdity.

The first cause of absurd conclusions is the lack of method—or anyway of the *right* method—in that they don't start from definitions, that is, from settled meanings for their words; as if they could make up accounts without knowing the value of the numeral words 'one', 'two', and 'three'.

As I mentioned in chapter 4, bodies enter on the basis of different features of them and ways of looking at them, and those bring with them differences in names. (For example, a single lump of stuff may bring in the word 'body' if we thinking of it just as a lump of material stuff, 'golden' if we are thinking of what kind of stuff it is composed of, 'cube' if we are thinking of its shape, and so on.) This allows various absurdities to come from confusion these different names and connecting them improperly into assertions. And therefore,

The second cause of absurd assertions is the giving of names of •bodies to •qualities, or of qualities to bodies. That's what people do when they say that faith is 'infused' or 'inspired' into someone, when really only *body* can be poured or breathed into anything; or that extension is body, when really it is a quality of body; that phantasms are spirits, when really they are states of animals, and so on.

The third cause of absurdity is the giving of the names of •qualities of bodies external to us to •qualities of our own bodies; which is what people do when they say that the colour is in the body, the sound is in the air, and so on.

The fourth cause is the giving of names of •names or speeches to •bodies, which is what people do when they say that there are universal things, that a living creature is a genus or a general thing, and so on. [Hobbes puts it the other way around: giving names of •bodies to •names or speeches; but his examples show that this was a slip.]

The fifth cause is the giving of names of •names and speeches to •qualities, which is what people do when they say that the nature of a thing is its definition, a man's command is his will, and the like. [Another reversal: Hobbes writes of giving names of •qualities to •names or speeches; but again the examples show what was meant.]

The sixth cause of absurdity is the use of metaphors, figures of speech, and other rhetorical devices, instead of words used strictly in their proper senses. In common speech it is all right to say, for example, 'the path goes that way' or '... leads that way', or to say 'the proverb says such-and-such'; but really paths cannot go, and proverbs cannot speak; so that in calculation and seeking the truth such turns of phrase are not to be admitted.

The seventh cause of absurdity is the use of names that don't mean anything, but are learned by rote from the schools—for example, 'hypostatic', 'transubstantiate',

'consubstantiate', 'eternal-now', and similar cant from the schoolmen.

Someone who can avoid all these things won't easily fall into any absurdity, unless what he is saying or writing is very long and in the later parts he forgets what he said earlier. For all men naturally reason in the same way, and reason well, when they have good principles. No-one is so stupid as both •to make a mistake in geometry and also •to persist in it after it has been pointed out to him!

From all this it appears that reason is not •born with us, like sense and memory; or •acquired through experience alone, as prudence is; but •achieved through *work*. First there is the work of giving suitable names to things; then the work of developing a good and orderly method for proceeding from •the elements—names—to •assertions made by connecting names with one another, and thence to •syllogisms, which are the connections of one assertion to another, till we come to •knowledge of all the consequences of names relating to the subject in hand; and that is what men call SCIENCE. [In this text, 'sequence' often replaces Hobbes's 'consequence'—a word which could in his time mean merely 'sequence', and often does so in what he writes. This last occurrence of 'consequence' is probably best understood in that way too: knowledge of all the [true] name-sequences, i.e. propositions, relating to the topic in hand. But it has been left as 'consequences' in preparation for what is to follow.] And whereas sense and memory are merely knowledge of *fact*, which is a past thing, and irrevocable because it is past, science is the knowledge of *consequences* and of the *dependence* of one fact on another. It is *this* knowledge that enables us, given that we can do *x* now, to know how to do a similar thing *y* at a later time if we want to; because when we see how something comes about, in what manner and through what causes, when similar causes come into our power we can see how to make them produce similar effects.

So children are not endowed with reason at all until they have acquired the use of speech; they are said to be 'reasonable creatures' because it is obviously possible for them to have the use of reason in time to come. As for the majority of men: they have a limited use of reasoning, for example in elementary numbering; but reason is not much good to them in everyday life, in which their guide is not something that makes them alike, *reason*, but rather things that differentiate them from one another. For they govern themselves—some better, some worse—on the basis of their differences of experience and quickness of memory, the different goals that they severally have, and specially of their good or bad luck and of the errors they make or that others around them make. They are so far from having *science*, or secure rules to guide their actions, that they don't even know what it is. They have thought of geometry as some kind of magic trick, and have made some use of it in that spirit; but as for other sciences, those who haven't been taught the starting-point and some of the first moves, so that they can see how the science is acquired and generated, are in this respect like children who have no thought of biological generation and are convinced by their mothers and nurses that their brothers and sisters are not born but found in the garden.

Still, those who have no science are in a better and nobler condition with their natural caution than are men who make mistakes in reasoning—or trust others who have made such mistakes—and are led by this to accept false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes and of rules doesn't lead men as far astray as does reliance on false rules, and thinking that what they want will be caused by something which in fact will cause the contrary.

To conclude: clear words, freed from ambiguity and clarified by exact definitions, are the light of human minds,

reason is the stride, growth of science is the path, and the well-being of mankind is the end of our journey. [Here 'end' probably has both its senses—our goal and our terminus.] And on the other side, metaphors and senseless and ambiguous words are like will-o'-the-wisps, reasoning with them is wandering among countless absurdities, and contention and sedition, or contempt, is their end.

Just as having *much experience* is having *prudence*, so knowing *much science* is having *sapience*. For though we usually use the one name 'wisdom' for both of these, the Latins always distinguished *prudencia* from *sapientia*, ascribing the former to experience and the latter to science. To make the difference between them appear more clearly, let us compare these two:

- (1) a man endowed with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his weapons;
- (2) a man who has all those skills and also has an acquired science of combat, a system of general principles concerning where he can hurt his adversary or be hurt by him, in every possible posture or position.

The ability of (1) would be to the ability of (2) as prudence is to sapience: both useful, but the latter infallible. In contrast to both of these, those who trust only to the authority of books, and blindly follow the blind, are like a man who relies on the false rules of an incompetent fencing master, and rashly attacks an adversary who kills or disgraces him.

Some of the signs of a person's having science—that is, being sapient—are certain and infallible; others are uncertain. We have a certain sign when someone who claims to have the science of something can demonstrate its truth clearly to someone else; and we have an uncertain sign when only some particular events make good his claim to knowledge, while many others don't. Signs of prudence

are all uncertain, because we can't observe by experience and remember *all* the circumstances that may affect a given outcome. But in any business in which you don't have •infallible science to guide you, you should rely on your own •natural judgment; to forsake that and instead to let yourself be guided by •general opinions that you have read in books—generalizations that are subject to many

exceptions—is a sign of folly such as is generally scorned by the name of 'pedantry'. Some men in parliamentary debates show off how well-read they are in politics and history; but few even of *them* are like this when their personal welfare is at stake. They are prudent in their private affairs, but in public they care more about the reputation of their own intelligence than about the outcome of anyone else's affairs.

## Chapter 6. The interior beginnings of voluntary motions, commonly called the passions, and the speeches by which they are expressed

There are in animals two sorts of motions that are special to them. (1) One kind is called *vital* motion; it starts when the animal is generated, a continues without interruption through its whole life: the circulation of the blood, the pulse, breathing, digestion, nutrition, excretion, and so on; none of which motions need any help from the imagination. (2) The other kind is *animal* motion, otherwise called *voluntary* motion—for example •walking, •speaking, •moving any of our limbs in whatever manner is first fancied [= 'imagined'] in our minds. I have already said in chapters 1 and 2 that

*sense* is motion in the organs and interior parts of a man's body, caused by the action of things that he sees, hears, etc.,

and that

*fancy* is merely what remains of that same motion after sense has stopped.

And because •walking, •speaking and other such voluntary motions always depend on a preceding thought of •where ·to walk to· and by what route, and •what ·to say·, it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion (·because that preceding thought occurs in the imagination, which I have said is also known as 'the understanding'·. Uneducated people don't think of any motion as occurring when the moving thing is invisible or the distance it moves is too short to be perceptible; but such motions *do* occur. Take a distance as short as you like, anything that moves across a distance *including* that one has to move across that little distance itself. These small beginnings of motion inside the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

When this endeavour is •a motion• toward something that causes it, it is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the latter being the general name, while the other is often restricted to hunger and thirst, that is, the desire for food •and drink•. And when the endeavour is •away from something, it is generally called AVERSION. The words ‘appetite’ and ‘aversion’ come to us from the Latins; and they both signify *motions*, one of approaching, the other of withdrawing. [The Latin ‘appeto’ has meanings that include ‘reach for, stretch out towards’, and ‘averto’ can mean ‘turn aside from’.] So also do the Greek words for the same. . . . It is interesting that those original word-meanings embody truths that were lost to, or denied by, philosophers. For nature itself often presses onto men truths that they stumble at when, later, they look for something beyond nature. The schools find no *actual* motion in a mere *desire to walk or to move*; but because they have to admit that motion is somehow involved they call it ‘metaphorical motion’; which is an absurd thing to say, because although words may be called ‘metaphorical’, bodies and motions cannot.

What men desire they are also said to LOVE, and they are said to HATE the things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing, except that by ‘desire’ we always signify the absence of the •desired• object, whereas by ‘love’ we usually signify that the object is present. So also by ‘aversion’ we signify the absence of the object, and by ‘hate’ its presence.

Of appetites and aversions, a few are born with men. Among those few are the appetite for food, and the appetite for urination and excretion—and these would be better characterized as aversions from certain bodily feelings. All our other appetites are for particular things—or specific kinds of things—and they come from experience, trying the effects of things on ourselves or on other people. The only •desire we can have relating to things that we don’t know at

all, or that we believe don’t •yet• exist, is the desire to taste and try them. But we can have •aversion not only for things that we know have hurt us but also for things of which don’t know whether they will hurt us.

Things that we neither desire nor hate we are said to contemn, CONTEMPT being nothing but the heart’s immobility or stubborn resistance to the action of certain things. It occurs when the heart is already moved in some other way by objects more powerful than the contemned ones, or from lack of experience of the latter. [Here and throughout this chapter, Hobbes uses ‘contemn’ and ‘contempt’ in their weakest sense, which doesn’t require outright despising something, and may be merely holding it to be of little account.]

And because the constitution of a man’s body is continually altering, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites and aversions; much less can all men agree in desiring the same object (except for a very few objects).

Whatever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire is what *he* calls ‘good’, the object of his hate and aversion he calls ‘evil’ •or ‘bad’•, and the object of his contempt he calls ‘low’ and ‘inconsiderable’. For the words ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘bad’ and ‘contemptible’ are always used in relation to the person using them. Nothing is simply and absolutely—i.e. just considered in itself—good or bad; there is no common rule of good and bad to be taken from •the nature of the objects themselves. All one has is a rule taken from •oneself (where there is no commonwealth) or, where there is a commonwealth, from •the person who represents it, or from •an arbitrator or judge whom disputing men agree to set up, making his judgment the rule of good and bad.

The Latin language has two words whose meanings are close to those of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, though not precisely the same. They are the words *pulchrum* and *turpe*. The former



signifies anything that by some apparent present signs promises good; and the latter whatever promises evil. But in English we don't have such general names as these. For *pulchrum* we say of some things 'fair', of others 'beautiful', or 'handsome', or 'gallant', or 'honourable', or 'comely', or 'amiable'; and for *turpe* we say 'foul', 'deformed', 'ugly', 'base', 'nauseous', and the like, as the subject shall require. All these words in their proper places signify nothing but the look or bearing or countenance that promises good or evil. So there are three kinds of good: good •in the promise, that is *pulchrum*; good •in effect, as the end desired, which is called *jucundum*, delightful; and good •as a means, which is called *utile*, profitable. Similarly on the bad side: for bad •in promise is what they call *turpe*; bad •in effect and as an end is *molestum*, unpleasant, troublesome; and bad in the means is *inutile*, unprofitable, hurtful.

When we *sense*, as I have said before, what •really happens inside us is only motion caused by the action of external objects, though it •appears to the sight as light and colour, to the ears as sound, to the nostrils as odour, and so on. Similarly, when the effects of that same object are continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the •real effect there is nothing but motion or endeavour, which consists in appetite towards or aversion away from the object •that caused the motion•. But the •appearance or sense of that motion is what we call 'delight' or 'trouble of mind'.

This motion that is called 'appetite' (or 'delight' or 'pleasure' considered as an appearance) seems to strengthen vital motion and to be a help to it; which is why it was appropriate for things that caused delight to be called *jucunda*, from helping or strengthening, and the contrary things to be called *molesta*, 'offensive', from hindering and troubling the vital motion.

So pleasure or delight is the appearance or sense of good; and molestation or displeasure is the appearance or sense of bad. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied with some delight, more or less, and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offence.

Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of a present object; and those can be called 'pleasures of sense'. (They are sometimes called 'sensual' pleasures, but only by those who condemn them; so 'sensual', •being value-laden•, has no place until there are laws.) Of this kind are all operations and exonerations of the body—that is, loading food and unloading excrement—as also everything that is pleasant to see, hear, smell, taste, or touch. Other pleasures arise from the expectation that comes from foreseeing some end or consequence of things, whether those things actually please or displease our senses when they happen. These are pleasures of the mind of the person who draws those consequences •and forms the corresponding expectations•, and are generally called JOY. Similarly, some displeasures are in the senses, and are called PAIN; others in the expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEF.

Each of these simple passions called 'appetite', 'desire', 'love', 'aversion', 'hate', 'joy', and 'grief' has different names for different contexts in which it occurs. (1) When they one succeed another, they are variously labelled according to men's opinion about the likelihood of attaining what they desire. (2) They can be variously labelled in terms of the object loved or hated; or (3) from the consideration of many of them together; or (4) from the alteration or succession itself.

Appetite with an expectation of success is called HOPE.

Appetite without such an expectation is called DESPAIR.

Aversion with the opinion that hurt will come from the object, FEAR.

Aversion, with a hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, COURAGE.

Sudden courage, ANGER.

Constant hope, CONFIDENCE in ourselves.

Constant despair, DIFFIDENCE about ourselves.

Anger for great hurt done to someone else, when we think it was done wrongly, INDIGNATION.

Desire for someone else's good, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Desire for riches, COVETOUSNESS: a name always used to express blame, because anyone contending for riches is displeased with anyone else's getting them; though the desire in itself ought to be blamed or not according to the means by which riches are sought.

Desire for office or rank, AMBITION: a name used also in the blame-expressing sense, for the reason just given for 'covetous'.

Desire for things that do little to further our ends, and fear of things that are little of a hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY [= 'pettiness of soul'].

Contempt towards little helps and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY [= 'greatness of soul'].

Magnanimity in face of danger of death or wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Magnanimity in the use of riches, LIBERALITY.

Pusillanimity in the use of riches, WRETCHEDNESS, MISERABLENESS, or—if the speaker likes it—PARSIMONY.

Love of persons for society, KINDNESS.

Love of persons only for pleasure of the senses, NATURAL LUST.

Love of the same, acquired from thinking over past pleasures, LUXURY.

Love of one person in particular, with a desire to be exclusively beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with

fear that the love is not returned, JEALOUSY.

Desire by hurting someone to make him condemn some past action of his own, REVENGEFULNESS.

Desire to know *why* and *how*, CURIOSITY. This occurs in no living creature but man; so that man is distinguished from other animals not only by his reason but also by this singular drive of curiosity. In the other animals, the appetite for food and the other pleasures of the senses push aside any concern for knowing causes. Curiosity is a lust of the mind which, because of the *lastingness* of delight in the continual and unresting accumulation of knowledge, surpasses the brief intensity of any carnal pleasure such as lust of the body.

Fear of invisible powers, whether privately invented or taken from stories that are publicly allowed, RELIGION; from stories that are not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when those powers are really such as we have imagined them to be, it is TRUE RELIGION.

Fear, without knowing what one is afraid of, or why, is PANIC TERROR, so-called from the fables that make Pan the author of them. Though really the first person in a group to experience such fear always has some notion of why, and the rest follow his example in running away, everyone supposing that the others know why. That is why this passion happens only to large groups of people.

Joy at something new, ADMIRATION [= 'surprise or wonder']; exclusive to man, because it excites the appetite for knowing the cause.

Joy arising from imagining one's own power and ability is the exultation of the mind called GLORYING. If this is based on experience of one's own former actions, it is the same as *confidence*: but if based on the flattery of others, or supposed by oneself only for delight in the consequences of it, it is called VAINGLORY. This is a good name for it;

because a well grounded confidence leads one to attempt things, whereas a mere supposition of power does not, and is therefore rightly called 'vain' [= 'pointless'].

The vainglory that consists in pretending or supposing we have abilities that we know we don't have occurs mostly in young men. It is nourished by the histories or fictions of heroes, and is often corrected by age and employment.

Grief from a belief that one lacks power is called DEJECTION of mind.

Sudden glory is the passion that causes those grimaces called LAUGHTER. It is caused either by •some sudden act of the person's own, that pleases him, or by •his awareness of something wrong with someone else, by comparison with whom he suddenly applauds himself. This happens mostly in people who are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves: they are forced to keep themselves in their own favour by observing the imperfections of other men. So, much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of small-mindedness. For one of the proper works of a great mind is to help and free others from scorn, and to compare itself only with the most able.

On the other side, sudden dejection is the passion that causes WEeping; and is caused by events that suddenly dash one's dearest hopes or kick away some prop of one's power; and it occurs mostly with those who—like women and children—rely principally on external helps. Some weep for the loss of friends, others for their unkindness; yet others for a reconciliation that puts a sudden stop to their thoughts of revenge. In all cases, both laughter and weeping are *sudden* motions, each taken away by the passage of time. For no man laughs at old jokes or weeps over an old calamity.

Grief for the discovery of some defect in one's own abilities is SHAME, or the passion that reveals itself in BLUSHING. It consists in the awareness of something dishonourable

·in oneself·; in young men it is a sign of the love of good reputation, and is commendable; in old men it is a sign of the same, but is not commendable because it comes too late.

The contempt for good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Grief for the calamity of someone else is PITY. It arises from the thought of a similar calamity befalling oneself, which is why it is called also COMPASSION [= 'feeling with'], and in the recently popularized phrase FELLOW-FEELING. That is why, for a calamity arising from great wickedness ·on the part of the person who suffers the calamity·, it is the best men who have the least pity; and for any given calamity, the least pity will come from those who think themselves least liable to something similar.

Contempt or little regard for the calamity of others is what men call CRUELTY; and it comes from the person's confidence about his own good fortune. I don't think it possible that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms without some goal of his own ·playing a part in his motivation·.

Grief over the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it is combined with an endeavour to exercise one's own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION; but when combined with an endeavour to trip up or hinder a competitor, it is ENVY.

Sometimes in the mind of a man appetites alternate with aversions, and hopes with fears, all concerning one thing. That happens when various good and bad consequences of doing or not doing the thing in question come successively into his thoughts, so that sometimes he has an appetite for it and sometimes an aversion from it. sometimes a hope to be able to do it and sometimes despair about that or fear to attempt it; and the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continuing until the thing is either done or thought impossible, is what we call DELIBERATION.

So there is no deliberation about past things, because it is manifestly impossible for them to be changed; or about things known (or thought) to be impossible, because men know (or think) that such deliberation is pointless. But we can deliberate about something that is impossible if we think it possible, because in that case we don't know that deliberation is pointless. It is still called 'deliberation', because it is a process of putting an end to the freedom we had to do or not do according to our appetite or aversion.

This alternation between appetites and aversions, between hopes and fears, occurs just as much in other living creatures as in man: and therefore beasts also deliberate.

Every deliberation is said to *end* at the point where the thing in question is either done or thought to be impossible, because until then we are free to do or not do it, according to our appetite or aversion.

In deliberation, the *last* appetite or aversion—the one that attaches *immediately* to the doing or to the not-doing—is what we call the WILL. This is the *act* of willing, not the faculty of willing [= 'the *ability* to will']. Beasts that deliberate must necessarily also have 'the ability to' will. 'The schoolmen would deny this, but for an invalid reason'. The schools commonly define the will as a 'rational appetite', but this is not a good definition. If it were sound, there could be no voluntary act against reason; for a voluntary act is simply one that proceeds from the will. But if instead of a 'rational appetite' we say an 'appetite resulting from a preceding deliberation', then the definition is the same as I have just given. *Will* therefore is the *last appetite in deliberating*. And though in ordinary talk we may say 'He once had a will to do that, but he didn't do it', that 'will' is strictly just an *inclination*, which is not enough to make an action voluntary, because the action depends not on it but on the *last* inclination or appetite. . . .

This makes it obvious that voluntary actions include not only •ones that come from greed, ambition, lust, or other appetites for the thing under deliberation, but also •ones that come from aversion or fear of the consequences of not doing the thing.

The forms of speech through which the •passions are expressed are partly the same as, and partly different from, those by which we express our •thoughts. First, generally all passions can be expressed •indicatively, as in 'I love', 'I fear', 'I joy', 'I deliberate', 'I will', 'I command'. Some of them have modes of speech all of their own, which are not affirmations although they can licence inferences to affirmations, inferences that come from the speech in question but not from the passion it expresses. [The following addition is based on help from Edwin Curley.] 'For example, *wishes* have the *optative* form: 'Would that the Queen had married!' is not an affirmation, expresses a passion (a wish), and supports an inference to the affirmation 'The Queen did not marry', which is a consequence of the optative but not of the wish it expresses. And *desires* have the *imperative* form: 'Return the money you stole!' is not an affirmation, expresses a passion (a desire), and supports an inference to the affirmation 'You stole money', which is a consequence of the imperative but not of the desire it expresses.

Deliberation is expressed •subjunctively, this being the right form of speech to signify suppositions and their consequences, as in 'If this be done, then that will follow'. This is the same as the language of reasoning, except that reasoning is conducted in general words, whereas deliberation mostly concerns particulars. The language of desire and aversion is •imperative, as in 'Do this' and 'Don't do that'. When the person spoken to is obliged to do or not do, this is a *command*; otherwise it is a *request* or else *advice*. The language of vainglory, of indignation, pity and revengefulness

is •optative, •as in ‘If only they would make me king!’•. To express *the desire to know* there is a special form called the •interrogative, as in ‘What is it?’ and ‘When will it?’ and ‘How is it done?’ and ‘Why?’ Those are the only forms of speech for expressing the passions that I can find. As for cursing, swearing, reviling, and the like: they aren’t speech, but merely the actions of a tongue that has acquired bad habits.

These forms of speech, I repeat, are *expressions* or *voluntary significations* of our passions; but they are not *certain signs* that the speaker has the signified passions, because anyone is free to use any one of them without having the associated passion. The best *signs* of a man’s passions at a given time are his facial expression, how he moves his body, and •what we can work out from• what we know independently of his actions and his goals.

In deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by what we think will be the good or bad consequences and upshots of the action we are deliberating about; and •estimating• this good or bad depends on foreseeing a long chain of consequences, of which one is seldom able to see to the end. But if *so far as a man can see* the good in those consequences outweighs the bad, the whole chain of consequences is—as writers say—‘apparent good’ or ‘seeming

good’. And when the bad outweighs the good •so far as the man can see•, the whole chain is ‘apparent evil’ or ‘seeming evil’. So the person whose experience or power of thought gives him the longest and surest view of consequences does the best job of deliberating for himself and, when he is willing to, of advising.

Continual success in obtaining the things you want when you want them—that is, continual prospering—is what men call HAPPINESS. [Throughout this text ‘happiness’ replaces Hobbes’s ‘felicity’.] I mean the •kind of• happiness of •which we have some chance in• this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind here on earth, because life itself is nothing but motion, and can never be without desire, or without fear, any more than it can be without sense. What kind of •heavenly• happiness God has ordained for those who devoutly honour him is something we can’t know in advance of enjoying it; for those •heavenly• joys are to us now as incomprehensible as the schoolmen’s phrase ‘beatific vision’ is unintelligible!

The form of speech through which men signify their belief in something’s goodness is PRAISE. The form through which they signify something’s power and greatness is MAGNIFYING. . . . And for present purposes that is enough about the PASSIONS.

## Chapter 7. The ends or resolutions of discourse

All discourse that is governed by a desire for knowledge eventually comes to an end—either in success or in abandonment of the search. And when something interrupts a chain of discourse, there is an end of it for that time.

If the discourse is merely mental, it consists of thoughts that the thing *will be*, *won't be* (or *has been*, *hasn't been*), alternately. So that wherever you break off the chain of a man's discourse, you leave him in a presumption of *it will be* or *it won't be* (or *has been* or *hasn't been*). All this is *opinion*. And •the alternation of appetites in deliberating about good and bad is exactly the same in shape as •the alternation of opinions in enquiring into the truth about past and future. And just as the last appetite in deliberation is called the 'will', so the last opinion in a search for the truth about past and future is called the JUDGMENT, or firm and final *sentence* of the person in question. And just as the whole chain of alternating appetites in the question of good or bad is called *deliberation*, so the whole chain of alternating opinions in the question of true or false is called DOUBT.

No discourse whatever can end in absolute knowledge of any past or future fact. For the knowledge of fact starts as *sense*, and from then on it is *memory*. As for the knowledge of consequences—which I have said before is called 'science'—it is not •absolute but •conditional. No man can know through discourse that

this or that is, this or that was, this or that will be,  
which is to know •absolutely; but only that

if this is so, so is that; if this was so, so was that; if  
this will be so, so will that;

which is to know •conditionally. Also, it is not about one *thing's* being consequent on *another thing*, but one *name's*

being consequent on another *name of the same thing*.

So when a discourse is put into speech, and begins with •the definitions of words, proceeds by connecting these into •general affirmations, and of these again into •syllogisms, the end or final sum—the bottom line of the calculation—is called •the conclusion. And the state of mind that it signifies is the conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE. But if such a discourse is not ultimately based on definitions, or if the definitions are not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again OPINION—namely, opinion about the truth of something said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless words with no possibility of being understood.

When two or more men know one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is to know it together. [The Latin roots of 'conscious' are 'con' = 'with', and 'scire' = 'know'.] And because several men in agreement are the best witnesses concerning actions by one of them or by someone else, it was and always will be thought a very bad act for any man to speak against his *conscience* [same Latin roots], or to corrupt or force anyone else to do so, for the plea of 'conscience' has been always heard with respectful sympathy. This word 'conscience' came to be misused in two ways. First, men used it metaphorically, to stand for their knowledge of their own secret acts and thoughts; it's in that usage that it is rhetorically said that the conscience is a thousand witnesses. And then men who were passionately in love with their own new opinions (however absurd), and obstinately determined to stick up for them, gave those opinions of theirs the revered name

of 'conscience', apparently wanting to suggest that it would be unlawful to change them or speak against them; and so they claimed to *know* they are true, when the most that they know is that they think them true.

When a man's discourse doesn't begin with definitions, it begins either •with some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called 'opinion' or with •something said by someone else whose ability to know the truth, and whose honesty, is not doubted by the man in question. In the latter case, the discourse is not so much about its ostensible topic as about the •trusted• person; and its resolution—its 'bottom line'—is called BELIEF and FAITH. Faith in the man; belief both of the man and of the truth of what he says. Thus, in *belief* there are two opinions—one of what he says, the other of his virtue. To have faith in a man, or to trust a man, or to believe a man, signify the same thing—namely the opinion that •the man is truthful, but to believe what is said signifies only the opinion that •what he says is true. It should be noted that the phrase 'I believe *in*. . . ' never occurs except in the writings of theologians. In other writings we don't find 'believe *in*' but rather 'I believe him', 'I trust him', 'I have faith in him', 'I rely on him'. . . . This peculiarity in the ecclesiastical use of the word has raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith.

By 'believing in', as it occurs in the creed, is meant not •trust in the person but •confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians but all sorts of men do believe in God in such a way as to regard as true everything they hear him say, whether or not they understand it. That

is as much faith and trust as can possibly be had in a person—*any* person—but they don't all *believe the doctrine* of the creed.

From this it follows that when we believe some statement to be true, on the basis not of •facts about the subject-matter of the statement, or of •the principles of natural reason, but of •the authority and good opinion we have of the person who made the statement, then the object of our faith is the speaker—that person—whom we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take; and our believing does honour to *him* only, •and not to *the statement* he has made. And consequently, when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himself, we are taking the church's word for it. Our belief, faith, and trust is just in the church. And those who believe what a prophet tells them in the name of God take the word of *the prophet*, do honour to *him*, and trust in *him*. . . . That is also how things stand with all other history as well. For if I didn't believe everything written by historians about the glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar, I don't think the ghost of Alexander or Caesar would have any just cause to be offended—nor would anybody else except the historians. If Livy says the Gods once made a cow speak, and we don't believe it, that expresses our distrust not of the Gods of but Livy. So that it is evident that whenever we believe something for no other reason than what is drawn from authority of men and their writings, whether they or not they are sent from God, our faith is only in men.

## Chapter 8. The virtues commonly called intellectual, and their contrary defects

Virtue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is something that is valued as making one stand out, and it depends on comparison. For if all qualities were equally present in all men, nothing would be prized. And by INTELLECTUAL virtues we understand such abilities of the mind as men praise, value, and desire for themselves. They commonly go under the name of 'good wit', though 'wit' is also used in a narrower sense to distinguish one particular intellectual ability from the rest.

These intellectual virtues are of two sorts—natural and acquired. By 'natural' I don't mean that a man has them from his birth, for *sensing* is the only thing of which that is true; and in their sensing abilities men differ so little from one another—and indeed from brute beasts—that sensing is not to be counted among virtues. What I mean by 'natural intellectual virtue' is the wit that is acquired purely through use and experience, without technique, development, or instruction. This NATURAL WIT consists mainly in two things: speed of imagining (that is, swift succession of one thought after another) and steady direction to some approved end. On the other side, a slow imagination makes the defect or fault of the mind that is commonly called 'DULLNESS', 'stupidity', and sometimes by other names that signify slowness of motion or resistance to being moved.

This difference in quickness is caused by differences in men's passions. People vary in what they like and dislike, and therefore some men's thoughts run one way and some another, and men differ in what they attend to and what they retain of the things that pass through their imagination. In this succession of men's thoughts there is nothing to attend to in the things they think about except in what ways they

are like one another, in what they are unlike, what use they are, and how they serve for a given purpose. Those who notice likenesses that are rarely noticed by others are said to have 'a good wit', which in this context means a good fancy. Those who notice differences and unlikenesses—which is called 'distinguishing' and 'discerning' and 'judging between thing and thing'—where the differences are not easy to spot, are said to have 'a good judgment'; and in conversational and business contexts where times, places, and persons have to be carefully and accurately distinguished, this virtue is called DISCRETION [here = 'the ability to discern, to make distinctions']. Fancy without the help of judgment is not commended as a virtue; but judgment and discretion is commended for itself, even without the help of fancy. Besides the discretion of times, places, and persons that is necessary for a good fancy, there is also required a frequent relating of one's thoughts to their purpose—that is, to some use to be made of them. Someone who has this virtue of discretion, if he is careful to relate his thoughts to their purpose, will easily find similarities and comparisons that will give pleasure not only as illustrating his discourse and adorning it with new and apt metaphors, but also insights that are rare and unusual. But when a great fancy is not accompanied by steadiness and direction to some end, it is one kind of madness—the kind possessed by people who, when they enter into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose by everything that comes in their thought, being drawn into so many digressions and parenthetical passages, and such long ones, that they utterly lose themselves: I know no particular name for this kind of folly, but I know some causes of it. One cause of it is lack of experience, which



results in a man's thinking to be new and rare something with which others are familiar; another cause is pusillanimity [= 'pettiness of soul'], whereby •someone sees as great something which to others is a trifle, and •whatever is new or great •in his estimation• and therefore thought fit to be told gradually nudges the man off his intended course.

In a good poem—whether epic or dramatic—and also in sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required; but the fancy must be more conspicuous, because poems please through their oddities (though they ought not to displease by indiscretion).

In a good history, *judgment* must be uppermost, because the goodness •of a history• consists in its method, its truth, and its choice of subject-matter. Fancy has no place here except in adorning the style.

In speeches of praise (and in invectives) the fancy is predominant, because the aim is not to speak the truth but to honour (or dishonour), which is done by noble (or nasty) comparisons. The judgment merely suggests what circumstances make an action laudable (or culpable).

In urgings and pleadings, it depends on what serves best for the design in hand: if it is •truth, then there is more need for judgment; if it is •disguise •of the truth•, then fancy is more required.

In demonstrations, in advice, and in all rigorous search for the truth, judgment does everything; except that sometimes the hearer's understanding needs to be *opened* by some apt comparison, and that requires some use of fancy. But metaphors are utterly excluded in this context. A metaphor openly announces its own untruthfulness, so it would obviously be foolish to admit it into advice or reasoning.

In any discourse whatever, if there is clearly a lack of discretion then, however wildly lavish the fancy is, the dis-

course as a whole will be taken as a sign of lack of wit; which will never happen when discretion is manifest, however humdrum the fancy is. [Hobbes is now using 'discretion'—the ability to make distinctions—in the special (and these days more usual) sense of 'the ability to distinguish occasions when some kind of behaviour is appropriate from ones where it is not'. See his next paragraph.]

A man's *secret thoughts* can run over anything—holy, profane, clean, obscene, solemn, frivolous—without his being ashamed or blamed; but *discourse in words* can introduce such topics only subject to the judgment's approving of the time, place, and persons. It is all right for •an anatomist or a physician to speak or write his opinion about unclean things, because he is speaking or writing not to please but to inform; but if •another man writes wild and whimsical fancies on such a subject, he is like someone who presents himself before good company after having been tumbled into the dirt. The •latter person's• lack of discretion is what makes the difference. Another example: it is all right for •someone who is engaged with his friends in openly casual conversation, to play with the sounds and ambiguous meanings of words, coming up with many colourful turns of phrase; but •in a sermon or public address, to an audience of people whom one doesn't know or whom one ought to reverence, *any* playing around with words will be regarded as folly; and •again• the difference is only in the lack of discretion. So that where wit is lacking, what is missing is not fancy but discretion. Judgment without fancy, therefore, is wit, but fancy without judgment is not.

When a man who has a design in hand thinks about a multitude of things, noting how they fit in with this design or what •other• design they might fit in with, if his thoughts along these lines are not obvious and usual ones, this exercise of his wit is called PRUDENCE. It requires one to have had much experience, and memory of similar matters

and their consequences on previous occasions. Men don't differ as much in prudence as they do in fancy and judgment, because two men of about the same age don't differ much in the *amount* of experience they have had; where they differ is in the *kinds* of experience they have had, because everyone has his own private designs and his own personal history. Governing a household well, and governing a kingdom well, don't require different degrees of prudence; they are simply different sorts of business. Just as painting a miniature and painting a life-size portrait don't require different degrees of artistic skill. •A plain farmer is more prudent in the affairs of •his own household than •a high statesman is in the affairs of •someone else.

If to prudence you add the use of unfair or dishonest means, such as men are usually led to by fear or need, you have the crooked wisdom known as CRAFT [= 'craftiness'], which is a sign of pusillanimity. For magnanimity—the opposite of pusillanimity—is contempt for unfair or dishonest helps. And what the Latins call *versutia* (translated into English as 'shifting') consists in putting off a present danger or inconvenience by getting into a greater future trouble, as when a man robs one person in order to pay another. This is just *shorter-sighted craft*. Its Latin name comes from *versura*, which signifies borrowing money in order to pay interest on a previous debt.

I have been writing about *natural wit*, as I called it near the start of this chapter. As for *acquired wit*—by which I still mean wit acquired by method and instruction—the only example of it is *reason*. This is based on the proper use of speech, and *the sciences* are based on it. But I have already spoken of reason and science in chapters 5 and 6.

The causes of the difference of wits that I have noted throughout this chapter lie in the passions; and the difference in passions comes partly from •differences of bodily

constitution, and partly from •difference of upbringing. For if the differences of wits came from differences in the state of the brain and the exterior or interior organs of sense, men would differ as much in their sight, hearing, or other senses as they do in their fancies and discretions. So the differences of wits come from the passions; and differences in *those* comes not only from difference in men's physical constitutions but also from differences in their customs and education.

The passions that mostly cause the differences of wit are people's greater or lesser desire for power, for riches, for knowledge, and for honour. And all of that comes down to the first—the desire for power—because riches, knowledge, and honour are just various kinds of power.

Consider a man who has no great passion for any of these things—a man who is, as they say, 'indifferent'. Though he may be a good man, in that he doesn't do anything wrong, he still can't possibly have either a great fancy or much judgment. For the thoughts serve the desires as scouts and spies, to explore the territory and find the path to the things that are desired; and all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all quickness of thought, come from this scouting activity. To have no desires is to be dead; to have weak passions is dullness; to have strong passions indiscriminately for everything is GIDDINESS and distraction; and to have stronger and more intense passions for something than is ordinarily seen in others is what men call MADNESS.

There are almost as many kinds of madness as there are kinds of passions. Sometimes •an extraordinary and extravagant passion is caused by •some defect in the organs of the body or some damage to them; and sometimes—in the reverse direction—the damage and indisposition of the organs is caused by •the intensity or long continuance of a passion. Either way it is exactly the same kind of madness.

The passion whose violence or continuance constitutes madness is either great vainglory (commonly called 'pride') or great dejection of mind.

Pride subjects a man to anger, and the excess of *that* is the madness called RAGE and FURY. That's how it comes about that •excessive desire for revenge, when it becomes habitual, damages the organs •of the body• and becomes rage; that •excessive love—with jealousy added in—also becomes rage; •excessive •good• opinion of oneself—as having divine inspiration, as being wise, learned, handsome, or the like—becomes distraction and giddiness, and when envy is combined with *that* the result is rage; and •intense belief in the truth of something that others contradict is rage.

Dejection subjects a man to causeless fears, which is a madness commonly called MELANCHOLY. This also shows itself—as rage does—in various kinds of behaviour: in the frequenting of lonely places and graves, in superstitious behaviour, and in fearing some particular thing (different things for different sufferers). Summing up: all passions that produce strange and unusual behaviour are given the general name 'madness'; but someone who was willing to take the trouble could list hosts of different kinds of madness. And if the excesses •of passion• are madness, there is no doubt that any passion that tends to evil is a mild madness, •even if it is not excessive•.

For example, though the madness of someone who thinks he is •divinely• inspired may not result in any very extravagant action on his part, when many such people work together the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what stronger evidence of madness can there be than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is what some quite small groups do: they clamour, fight against, and destroy those by whom they have been protected against injury throughout their lifetimes. And

if this is madness in the group, it is the same in every individual man. A man standing in the waves doesn't hear any sound from the part of the water that is right next him, but he knows perfectly well that that part contributes as much to the roaring of the sea as does any other part of the same size. In the same way, although we notice no great disturbance in one or two men, we can be very sure that their individual passions are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation. And if nothing else showed their madness, their mere claim to be inspired is evidence enough. If a man in the madhouse says he is God or Christ, we will know why he has been shut up there!

This belief that one is inspired (commonly called 'private spirit') very often begins from some lucky discovery of an error in a commonly accepted belief. The discoverer doesn't know or doesn't remember what reasonable process brought him to this notable truth (as he thinks it to be, though in many cases what he has 'discovered' is an untruth), so he is immediately struck with wonder at himself, as being in the special grace of God almighty who has revealed this truth to him supernaturally.

For further evidence that madness is nothing but a powerful and disproportionate passion, consider the effects of wine. They are the same as the disorders of the bodily organs •that produce excessive passions•. The variety of behaviour in men who have drunk too much is the same as that of madmen: some of them raging, others loving, others laughing—according to their different dominant passions—all doing it extravagantly. That is because the effect of the wine is merely to hide from the drinker how ugly his passions are, so that he doesn't mind letting them show. For I believe that •even• the most sober of men, when they are on their own, relaxed, and not thinking about business, have thoughts whose vanity and extravagance they would

not want to be publicly seen; which amounts to accepting that unguided passions are mostly mere madness.

In ancient times and more recently there have been two common opinions regarding the cause of madness. Some have held •that madness comes from the passions; others •that it is caused by good or bad demons or spirits which (they think) enter into the man, take him over, and move his organs in the strange and unfamiliar manner that is customary in madmen. •The former sort call such men ‘madmen’; but •the latter have sometimes called them demoniacs (that is, possessed with spirits). . . .

There was once a great gathering of people in the Greek city of Abdera, to see the acting of the tragedy *Andromeda* on an extremely hot day. Many of the spectators fell into fevers as a result of the heat and the tragedy jointly, leading them to do nothing but pronounce lines of verse containing the names of Perseus and Andromeda. This behaviour was cured, as was the fever, by the advent of winter; and this madness was thought to have come from the passion imprinted by the tragedy. In another Greek city there reigned a fit of madness which seized only the young maidens, and caused many of them to hang themselves. Most people thought this was an act of the Devil. But someone suspected that the young women’s disregard for their own lives might come from some passion of the mind, and conjectured that they wouldn’t similarly disregard their honour—including their personal modesty, this being a passion that might outweigh the fatal one by which they were gripped. So he advised the magistrates to strip each woman who had hanged herself, letting them all hang out naked. This, the story says, cured that madness. But, on the other side, those same Greeks often ascribed madness to the operation of the Eumenides (or Furies), and sometimes to Ceres, Phoebus, and other gods. This is an example of how much ·reality· they attributed to

phantasms, going so far as to think them to be airy living bodies, and to classify them as ‘spirits’. The Romans shared these beliefs with the Greeks, and so also did the Jews: they called madmen ‘prophets’ or ‘demoniacs’ (depending on whether they thought the spirits good or bad); some of them characterized both prophets and demoniacs as ‘madmen’; and some called the same individual man both ‘demoniac’ and ‘madman’.

This is not surprising in •the non-Jewish peoples, because they classified as ‘demons’ (and worshipped as such) diseases and health, vices and virtues, and many natural states and features. So that ·among them· a man could use the word ‘demon’ to refer to a fever as well as to a devil. But for •the Jews to have such an opinion is somewhat strange. For Moses and Abraham claimed to prophesy on the basis not •of being possessed by a spirit but •of hearing the voice of God, or •of a vision or dream, And in the law of Moses there is nothing—moral or ceremonial—which taught the Jews that there is any such thing as possession by a spirit. . . . When the Scriptures refer to ‘the spirit of God in man’ they mean the spirit of a man who is inclined to godliness. And where the Bible says ‘whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom to make garments for Aaron’ (*Exodus 28:3*) it doesn’t mean that a spirit that can make garments has been put into them. Rather, it is referring to *their own* spirits’ wisdom in that kind of work. Similarly, when the spirit of man produces unclean actions, it is ordinarily called ‘an unclean spirit’, and the same for other kinds of spirits—not absolutely always, but whenever the virtue or vice in question is extraordinary and conspicuous. Nor did the other prophets of the old Testament claim that they were possessed by spirits, or that God spoke *in* them; rather, they claimed that God spoke *to* them—by voice, vision, or dream. As for ‘the burden of the Lord’: this was not possession, but command. How, then,

could the Jews succumb to this belief about possession? The only cause I can think of applies not just to Jews but to all men: their lack of curiosity about natural causes, and their tying of happiness to the acquiring of the gross pleasures of the senses and of things that most immediately produce them. When such people see that a man's mind has some strange and unusual ability or defect, unless they also see what probably caused it, they can hardly think it natural; and if they think it is not natural, they have to think it supernatural; and then (they conclude) what can it be but that either God or the Devil is in him?

And so it happened that when our Saviour was hemmed in by the crowd, his friends feared that he was mad and tried to restrain him; but the scribes said that he had the Devil in him, and that *that* was what enabled him to cast out devils—as if the greater madman had awed the lesser! (*Mark* 3:21). And it happened that some said 'He has a devil' and 'He is mad', whereas others took him to be a prophet, and said 'These are not the words of someone who has a devil inside him.' (*John* 10:20). Again, in the old Testament a prophet came to anoint Jehu, but some of Jehu's people asked him 'What is that madman doing here?' (*2 Kings* 9:11). Clearly, then, whoever behaved in extraordinary manner was thought by the Jews to be possessed with either a good or an evil spirit; except for the Sadducees, who erred so far in the other direction as not to believe there were any spirits at all (which is very near to direct atheism), which may have provoked others to label them as 'demoniacs' rather than as 'madmen'.

But why then does our Saviour go about curing of them as though they were possessed, not as though they were mad? I reply that arguments taken from a mere *manner of speaking* are not solid. Consider how often sacred Scripture speaks of the earth as immobile, though almost all scientists today

think there is very clear evidence that it moves! Scripture was written by the prophets and apostles not to teach science, which God leaves to the exercise of natural reason in thought and debate, but to teach piety and the way to eternal salvation. This objective of promoting our obedience and subjection to God almighty is not in the least affected by whether day and night are made by the movement of the earth or of the sun, or by whether men's weird actions come from passion or from the devil—so long as we don't *worship* the devil.

As for the fact that our Saviour speaks to the disease as to a person: that is usual among those who cure by words alone, as Christ did (and as enchanters claim to do, whether they speak to a devil or not). For isn't Christ also said to have rebuked the winds? (*Matthew* 8:26.) But in case you reply that winds are spirits, I add another example: Isn't he also said to rebuke a fever? (*Luke* 4:39.) Yet this doesn't show that Christ thought that a fever is a devil. Many of those 'devils' are said to have acknowledged Christ, but we can interpret those passages as saying only that those madmen acknowledged him. Then there is the passage (*Matthew* 12:43) where our Saviour speaks of an unclean spirit that goes out of a man, wanders through dry places seeking rest, and finding none and returns into the same man bringing with it with seven even worse spirits. This is obviously a parable; it concerns a man who makes some attempt to quit his lusts, is defeated by the strength of them, and thus becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture requiring a belief that 'demoniacs' were anything but madmen.

Writing about misuses of words in chapter 5, I discussed one that can also be classified as a sort of madness; namely *absurdity*. That is what we have when men in their speech string words together in such a way as to have no meaning

at all. Some people *accept* these ·absurd strings· through misunderstanding what they hear, and then repeat them parrot-fashion ·thus prolonging their life·; other people ·perpetuate them· out of an intention to deceive through obscurity. This occurs only in discourse about questions in incomprehensible matters, as the schoolmen do, or about questions in abstruse philosophy. Ordinary people seldom speak meaninglessly, which is why they are regarded as idiots by those other *distinguished* persons! But to be assured that the latter's words have nothing corresponding to them in the ·speaker's· mind, you may want some examples. If you do, get hold of a schoolman and see if he can translate •any one chapter about one of the difficult points—the Trinity, the Deity, the nature of Christ, transubstantiation, free-will, or the like—into •any of the modern languages, so as to make it intelligible; or into •any tolerable Latin such as people knew back when the Latin tongue was an everyday language. What is the meaning of these words?

The first cause does not necessarily inflow anything into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work.

They translate the title of chapter 6 of Suarez's first book, *Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God*. When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or don't they intend to make others so? And especially in the question of *transubstantiation*, where after uttering certain words they that say that

the whiteness, roundness, magnitude, quality, corruptibility—all which are incorporeal, etc.—go out of the ·communion· wafer into the body of our blessed Saviour,

don't they treat those *nesses*, *tudes*, and *ties* as a bunch of spirits possessing his body? For by 'spirits', they mean things that are incorporeal but nevertheless can move from one place to another. So that this kind of absurdity can rightly be counted as a sort of madness. People who are subject to it do sometimes avoid disputing or writing in such terms; those times—when the people are guided by clear thoughts relating to worldly pleasures—are merely lucid intervals ·between long periods of madness·.

That is all I have to say about intellectual virtues and defects.